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Abstract 
We analyze the optimal location choice of a monopolistic firm that operates two platforms on 
a two-sided market. We show that the optimal platform locations are equivalent to the one-
sided benchmark if both sides are either restricted to single- or multi-homing. In the mixed 
case (one side single-homes, the other one multi-homes), the optimal platform locations are 
determined by the relative profitability of both market sides. Our results indicate that 
modeling mergers on two-sided markets with fixed locations is often inappropriate. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes the location choice of a monopolistic firm that operates on a two-sided 
market. The one-sided analogue to this problem is the location choice of a multi-store 
monopolist, which was studied by Salop (1979) and Katz (1980), and later by Hanjoul et al. 
(1990), Hansen, Peeters, and Thisse (1997), and Dasci and Laporte (2004). Location choice 
can be understood literally, and the question is, where to locate the store(s) in a specified 
geographical space. An alternative interpretation is the one of horizontal product 
differentiation. 
 
So far, monopolistic location choice has not been analyzed in the context of two-sided 
markets, i.e. markets where platforms facilitate interaction between two distinct groups of 
agents. While there is a growing body of literature dealing with two-sided markets, the most 
prominent papers are Roche and Tirole (2003, 2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), and 
Armstrong (2006), who analyze monopolistic and duopolistic pricing decisions in various 
two-sided settings. The vast majority of the mentioned papers focus on oligopolistic 
frameworks, and the monopoly case is often used as a benchmark for comparing the results. 
However, the monopolistic behaviour is usually not explicitly analyzed in detail. Instead, it is 
assumed that platform locations as well as the number of platforms remain unchanged. For 
instance, Anderson and Coate (2005) analyze a duopolistic model of media markets where 
consumers’ taste is modelled in a framework based on Hotelling (1929). The platform 
locations are supposed to be at both ends of the unit line and this assumption is retained in the 
monopoly case, i.e. the case where both platforms operate under joint management. 
Recently, monopolistic location choice on two-sided markets has become particularly 
relevant, because economic literature started to explicitly analyze merger cases in two-sided 
frameworks. For instance, Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) propose a Hotelling-based 
model to study merger cases in the Canadian newspaper industry empirically. Ambrus and 
Reisinger (2006) compare monopolistic and duopolistic outcomes on media markets where 
agents are allowed to multi-home, i.e. they are allowed to simultaneously patronize both 
platforms. Leonello (2010) analyzes the welfare effects of mergers on two-sided markets. A 
common feature of these papers is the use of a Hotelling framework with two platforms, 
where the platform locations remain unchanged when comparing the case of monopoly to the 
case of competing platforms. 
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In the present paper, we study the optimal location choice of a monopolist that operates one or 
two platforms under various two-sided settings. The results of our paper indicate that a profit-
maximizing firm will not keep the platform locations at the extremes of the Hotelling line. 
Instead, we find that in case of two-sided single-homing, i.e. if agents on either side of the 
market are restricted to patronizing one platform only, the monopolist will choose a smaller 
degree of product differentiation, whereas under two-sided multi-homing, the firm will 
choose homogeneous platforms. While these results are in line with the corresponding 
findings from one-sided markets, we show that in a “competitive bottleneck” scenario, i.e. if 
agents on one side of the market are restricted to single-homing, whereas agents on the 
opposite side are allowed to multi-home, the relative profitability of the market sides will 
determine the outcome. 
 
The paper is constructed as follows: In Section 2, we will present the theoretical framework, 
whereas Section 3 analyzes the optimal location choice under two-sided single-homing. 
Section 4 deals with the case of two-sided multi-homing and in Section 5, we study the 
location and pricing decisions in a “competitive bottleneck” model. Section 6 summarizes our 
findings. 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
 
Consider a two-sided market that is served by a monopolistic firm operating { }1, 2N ∈  
platforms. Given a specific platform i N∈ , agents on market side 1,2k =  obtain an intrinsic 
utility ikv  from joining this platform. In addition, there is as a network utility ik knα −⋅  resulting 
from the interaction with i kn−  agents from the opposite market side, where kα  denotes the 
magnitude of the network externality. Hence, 0kα >  implies an additional benefit from 
interaction, whereas 0kα <  describes a negative network externality. In the special case 
0kα = , network effects are absent. 
Platforms are heterogeneous and we assume that the agents on either side of the market are 
uniformly distributed along the unit line. The mass of agents on each market side is 
normalized to one. Given a specific platform location [ ]0,1ix ∈ , an agent on market side k, 
who is located at [ ]0,1kx ∈ɶ , has to pay transportation costs ( )k i kt x x− ɶ  if it holds that 
0 ix x≤ ≤ɶ . In case that 1i kx x< ≤ɶ , transportation costs are given by ( )k k it x x−ɶ . As per usual, 
we suppose that 0kt > . The monopolist charges the price 
i
kp  for joining platform i. As we 
assume perfect platform symmetry throughout the paper, we can immediately conclude that 
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all platforms will charge an identical price on market side k, denoted by kp . Given the 
specifications above, the utility of an agent on market side k, who joins platform i, is 
described by  
( )
( )
for 0
for 1
i
k k k k k i k ki
k i
k k k k k k i k
v n p t x x x x
U
v n p t x x x x
α
α
−
−
 + ⋅ − − − ≤ ≤
= 
+ ⋅ − − − < ≤
ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ
, 
The reservation utility is normalized to zero. 
In order to keep the framework consistent to the literature dealing with monopolistic location 
choice on one-sided markets, we impose full market coverage, i.e. in the optimum the entire 
market has to be served. We assume that variable costs for production and for the choice of 
location are nil. In addition, fixed costs are also supposed to be absent. 
 
3. Two-Sided Single-Homing 
 
In this section we assume that agents on either side of the market are restricted to single-
homing. The optimal monopolistic location choice in this case is characterized by the results 
given in Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: For 1N = , the optimal platform location is *1 1/ 2x = , while in case of 2N = , 
the platforms are located at *1 1/ 4x =  and 
*
2 3 / 4x = . 
Proof: First, we consider the case of 1N = . By the assumption of full market coverage, we 
can immediately conclude that 1 21 1 1n n= = . The monopolistic platform operator will maximize 
her profit by setting a price, where the marginal agent is indifferent between joining the 
platform and using the outside option, i.e. obtaining the reservation utility. Let *kxɶ  denote the 
location of the marginal agent. Then, it follows that for 10 1/ 2≤ ≤x , we have 
* 1kx =ɶ , while in 
case of 11/ 2 1< ≤x , we find that 
* 0kx =ɶ . Since the marginal agent’s utility equals the 
reservation utility, we know that  
( ) ( )* 11 1 1 0k k k k k kU x v p t x= = + ⋅ − − ⋅ − =ɶ α  
( ) ( )* 10 1 0 0k k k k k kU x v p t x= = + ⋅ − − ⋅ − =ɶ α . 
Hence, the optimal monopoly price is described by 
(1) ( )1 1*
1 1
1 0 1/ 2
1/ 2 1
 + − ⋅ − ≤ ≤
= 
+ − ⋅ < ≤
k k k
k
k k k
v t x for x
p
v t x for x
α
α
 . 
Respecting that variable costs are equal to zero and using equation (1), the platform operator’s 
maximization problem is characterized by 
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( ) ( ) ( )
1
* 1 * 1
1 1 1 1 2 1 2max
x
x p x n p x nΠ = ⋅ + ⋅ ⇔  
( ) ( )( )1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 
1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 
0 1/2
max
1/ 2 1x
v v t t t t x for x
x
v v t t x for x
α α
α α
 + + + − − + + ⋅ < ≤Π = 
+ + + − + ⋅ < ≤
, 
yielding the first-order condition 
1 2
1 21
0
0
t t
t tx
+ >∂Π
= 
− − <∂ 
, 
from which we can conclude that the optimal platform location is *1 1/ 2=x . 
In case of 2=N , we know that due to full market coverage and perfect platform symmetry, 
we have that 1 2 1 21 1 2 2 1/ 2= = = =n n n n . The platform locations are 1x  and 2 11= −x x . For 
10 1/ 4≤ ≤x , the marginal agent’s location is 
* 1/ 2=ɶkx , whereas for 11/ 4 1/ 2≤ ≤x , we have 
that * 0kx =ɶ . Since in the optimum the marginal agent’s utility is still the reservation utility 
level, the monopoly price is given by 
1 1*
1 1
/ 2 / 2 0 1/ 4
/ 2 1/ 4 1/ 2
+ − + ⋅ ≤ ≤
= 
+ − ⋅ < ≤
k k k k
k
k k k
v t t x for x
p
v t x for x
α
α
. 
Hence, the maximization problem is  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )1
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1
1
1 2
1 2 1 2 1
0  1/ 4
2 2
max
1/ 4  1/ 2
2
i
x
i
t t
v v t t x for x
x
v v t t x for x
α α
α α
 + +
+ + − + + ⋅ ≤ ≤Π = 
+ + + − + ⋅ ≤ ≤
, 
yielding the first-order condition 
1 2
1 21
0
0
t t
t tx
+ >∂Π
= 
− − <∂ 
, 
from which we conclude that the optimal platform locations are *1 1/ 4=x  and 
*
2 1 1/ 4 3 / 4= − =x . 
(q.e.d.) 
 
The results of Proposition 1 are entirely consistent with the findings from one-sided markets. 
As can be seen from the first-order conditions, the optimal location choice is only influenced 
by the transportation cost parameters, while there is no impact from the network externalities. 
This is not surprising, since the network effects do not affect the location of the marginal 
agent. Therefore, there is no marginal impact of 1x  on the optimal monopoly price. However, 
there is a quantitative influence on prices and profit, because the two-sidedness of the market 
affects the marginal agent’s willingness to pay. 
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For 1N = , the operator’s profit in the optimum is given by 
(2) ( ) ( )1 2* 1 2 1 21 2
t t
N v v α α
+
Π = = + + + − , 
whereas for 2N = , we have that 
(3) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2* 1 22 2 4
t t
N v v
α α+ +
Π = = + + − . 
Comparing equations (2) and (3), it is easy to verify that for 0kα < , ( ) ( )* *1 2N NΠ = < Π = , 
i.e. the monopolist will operate two platforms. This corresponds to economic intuition: Both 
market sides affect each other negatively. Offering a second platform decreases the exposition 
to the other market side, so that the marginal agent’s willingness to pay increases, which 
yields higher profits. For the case of 0kα >  and 0kα− < , we obtain ambiguous results, i.e. for 
specific parameter sets, the monopolist would only operate one platform. The same holds for 
the presence of positive externalities on either side of the market, i.e. for 0kα > .  
 
4. Two-Sided Multi-Homing 
 
In contrast to Section 3, we now assume that agents on both market sides are allowed to 
multi-home. Here, it is supposed that the agents obtain the intrinsic utility ikv  from each 
platform they join. Since multi-homing requires the presence of at least two platforms, we 
focus on the case of 2=N , which is visualized in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Platform-specific demand in case of two-sided multi-homing  
 
Figure 1 depicts the unit line for given platform locations ( )1 2 1, 1= −x x x . Let ɶkx  denote the 
location of an arbitrary agent. Then, due to the assumption of full market coverage and 
supposing that multi-homing exists in the optimum,1 we know that for [ ]10,∈ɶkx x , an agent 
will join platform 1 in any case, while for [ ]1,1∈ɶkx x , an agent will patronize the first 
                                                     
1
 If there was no multi-homing in the optimum, we would have local monopolies, but these are out of the scope 
of this analysis. 
0 12 1x1 1–x1
single-
homing
on
Platform 1
single-
homing
on
Platform 2
multi-homing
ɶRkxɶ
L
kx
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platform as long as the utility is at least as great as the reservation utility. If the location of the 
marginal agent is denoted by ɶRkx , we find that 
(4) ( ) 11 11 0 −− + ⋅ − + ⋅= + ⋅ − − ⋅ − = ⇔ =ɶ ɶR R k k k k kk k k k k k k k
k
v n p t xU v n p t x x x
t
α
α . 
The same argument holds for platform 2, where the location of the marginal agent is denoted 
by ɶLkx . This specific location is determined by 
(5) ( ) 22 111 0 −− − − ⋅ + + − ⋅= + ⋅ − − ⋅ − − = ⇔ =ɶ ɶL L k k k k k kk k k k k k k k
k
v n p t t xU v n p t x x x
t
α
α . 
From Figure 1 it is easy to see that (1 )+ −ɶ ɶL Rk kx x  agents single-home, while the number of 
multi-homing agents is described by −ɶ ɶR Lk kx x . Since we know that the demand for each 
platform consists of multi-homing agents and the corresponding number of single-homing 
agents, we use (4) and (5) to find that 
(6) 
1
1 1−+ ⋅ − + ⋅
= + − = =ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶL R L R k k k k kk k k k k
k
v n p t x
n x x x x
t
α
, 
(7) 
2
2 11 1 1 −− − ⋅ + + − ⋅= − + − = − = −ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶR R L L k k k k k kk k k k k
k
v n p t t x
n x x x x
t
α
. 
 
Simultaneously solving equations (6) and (7) for 1kn  and 2kn , yields the platform-specific 
demand functions that are described by 
(8) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 11 21 1
1 2 1 2
⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ +
= = −
⋅ − ⋅
v p t v p x t t
n n
t t
α α
α α
, 
(9) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 21 22 2
1 2 1 2
⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ +
= = −
⋅ − ⋅
v p t v p x t t
n n
t t
α α
α α
. 
Given (8) and (9), we are now able to analyze the optimal location choice of the monopolistic 
platform operator. Proposition 2 summarizes the results. 
 
Proposition 2: If agents are allowed to multi-home, the optimal platform locations are given 
by * *1 2 1/ 2= =x x . 
Proof: Using equations (8) and (9), the monopolist’s maximization problem can be 
formulated as  
( ) ( )
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
,
max
p p
p n n p n nΠ = ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⇔  
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1
1
,
1 2 1 2
max 2
 ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ +
Π = ⋅ − ⋅ 
⋅ − ⋅ p p
v p t v p x t t
p
t t
α α
α α
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( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
2
1 2 1 2
2
v p t v p x t t
p
t t
α α
α α
 ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ ⋅ − 
⋅ − ⋅ 
, 
yielding the profit maximizing platform prices that are given by 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
*
1 2
1 1 2 1 2
2
2 4
 + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ 
=
+ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
v t x t t t v t x v t x t v t x
p
t t
α α α α
α α α
, 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1
*
2 2
2 1 2 1 2
2
2 4
 + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ 
=
+ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
v t x t t t v t x v t x t v t x
p
t t
α α α α
α α α
. 
The operator’s optimization problem with respect to the optimal location choice is therefore  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
1
* 1 * 2 * * 1 * 2 *
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1max
x
p x n p x n p x p n p x n p xΠ = ⋅ + + ⋅ + , 
which yields the first-order condition 
(10) 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
* *
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1
2 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 2
0
2 4
t t v v t t x t v t v t x
x t t
α α
α α α α
 
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + + ⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅∂Π  
= − =
∂ + + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
. 
Equation (10) can easily be solved for *1x . It can be shown that 1 0∂Π ∂ >x  for [ ]*1 0,1/ 2∈x  
and 1 2 1 2, , , 0>v v t t . This implies that the optimal platform locations are determined by the 
corner solution * *1 2 1/ 2= =x x . 
(q.e.d.) 
 
Considering a one-sided benchmark where multi-homing is allowed, i.e. the special case of 
our model where 0kα = , we find by using equation (10) that for [ ]*1 0,1/ 2∈x  it holds that  
( )( ) ( )
*
1 2 1 2 1 2 1
*
1 2 1 2 1
1 1 2
2 2
0
4
t t v v t t x
v v t t x
x t t
 
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + + ⋅∂Π  
= − = + + + ⋅ >
∂ − ⋅ ⋅
, 
which implies that there is no qualitative difference to the results of Proposition 2. Hence, the 
two-sidedness of the market does not affect the optimal location choice, so that the result is 
consistent with the one-sided benchmark case. 
 
Given the optimal platform locations * *1 2 1/ 2= =x x , we find that for 2N = , the optimal 
monopoly profit is described by 
(11) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* 2 21 2 1 2
12
2 4
N
t tα α
Π = = − ⋅
⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 21 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 24 ( 24 2 )4 )(t t v t t v t t v v t v t vα α ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + ++ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅   . 
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Since for 1N = , the operator’s profit is still determined by equation (2),2 we can conclude by 
comparing (2) and (11) that ( ) ( )* *1 2N NΠ = < Π = , i.e. in case of two-sided multi-homing, 
the monopolist will in any case operate two platforms. This result is not surprising, since we 
had assumed that agents obtain the intrinsic utility twice if they join both platforms, which 
ceteris paribus implies a strong incentive for multi-homing and a higher willingness to pay if 
two platforms are available. It is easy to construct a robustness check that grants the intrinsic 
utility only once. This weakens the incentive for multi-homing. One could also assume that 
repeated interaction is meaningless, i.e. if two multi-homing agents interact on one platform, 
there is no additional network effect from interacting on the second platform. The only 
remaining incentive to multi-home is the interaction with single-homing agents. The results of 
our robustness checks indicate that the optimal platform locations are consistent with our 
findings from Proposition 2. However, comparing the profits for 1N =  and 2N =  yields 
ambiguous results.  
 
5. Competitive Bottlenecks 
 
In this section, we will analyze a “competitive bottleneck” model, i.e. a framework where 
agents on one side of the market are allowed to single-home, while agents on the opposite 
side of the market are allowed to multi-home. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
market side 1 is the single-homing side, whereas multi-homing agents on market side 2 are 
still supposed to obtain intrinsic utility from each platform they join. Supposing that multi-
homing is present in the optimum, we focus on the case of 2=N  again. The platform 
locations are still denoted by 1x  and 2 11= −x x . 
 
Considering market side 1, we know that the marginal agent is indifferent between joining 
platform 1 and platform 2, i.e. it holds that 1 21 1=U U . Let the location of the marginal agent be 
denoted by 1ɶ
INDx . Then, we know that 
( ) ( )1 1 2 21 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 11+ ⋅ − − ⋅ − = = = + ⋅ − − ⋅ − −ɶ ɶIND INDv n p t x x U U v n p t x xα α , 
which implies that 1ɶ
INDx  is given by 
1 2
1 2 1 2 1
1
1 2
IND nx
n t
t
α α⋅ − ⋅ +
⋅
=ɶ . 
Hence, we know that the platform-specific demand on the single-homing side is characterized 
by  
                                                     
2
 If there is just one platform, agents cannot multi-home. 
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(12) 
1 2
1 21 2
1
1 1
1
12
IND n
n
n t
x
t
α α⋅ − ⋅ +
=
⋅
= ɶ , 
(13) 
1 2
1 2 1 2 1
1
2
1 1 2
1 1IND n n
t
n x
tα α⋅
= − = −
− ⋅ +
⋅
ɶ . 
Analogue to Section 4, the platform-specific demand on the multi-homing side is determined 
by those agents that are located at 2ɶ
Rx  and 2ɶ
Lx . Following our analysis from Section 4, these 
locations are now given by 
(14) ( ) 11 2 2 1 2 2 12 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2
2
0 + ⋅ − + ⋅= + ⋅ − − ⋅ − = ⇔ =ɶ ɶR R v n p t xU v n p t x x x
t
α
α , 
(15) ( ) 22 2 2 1 2 2 2 12 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
2
1 0 − − ⋅ + + − ⋅= + ⋅ − − ⋅ − − = ⇔ =ɶ ɶL L v n p t t xU v n p t x x x
t
α
α . 
Using equations (14) and (15), we find that  
(16) 
1
1 2 2 1 2 2 1
2 2 2 2 2
2
+ ⋅ − + ⋅
= + − = =ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶL R L R
v n p t x
n x x x x
t
α
, 
(17) 
2
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1
2 2 2 2 2
2
1 1 1 − − ⋅ + + − ⋅= − + − = − = −ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶR R L L v n p t t xn x x x x
t
α
, 
which allows us to compute the platform-specific demand functions by simultaneously 
solving equations (12), (13), (16), and (17) for 1kn  and 2kn . Hence, we have that 
(18) 1 21 1 1/ 2= =n n , 
(19) 2 2 2 21 22 2 1
2
2 2 2
2
p v t
n n
x
t
α− + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
−
⋅
= = . 
 
Given (18) and (19), we are now able to analyze the price-setting behaviour of the 
monopolistic platform operator, which is more complex than in the previous sections. On 
market side 1, the optimal monopoly price is determined by the marginal agent. Recalling our 
findings from Section 3, we know that the marginal agent’s location, *1ɶx , is given by 
1*
1
1
1/ 2 0 1/ 4
0 1/ 4 1/ 2
for x
x for x
≤ ≤
=  ≤ ≤
ɶ . 
Respecting that in the optimum the marginal agent’s utility equals her reservation utility and 
using equation (19), we find that the optimal monopoly price on market side 1 is given by 
(20) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1
2
1 2 2
1
*
1
1
2 2 1 2 1 1 1
2
0 1/ 4
1/ 4 1/ 2
2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
2
p v t t t v t x t
t
p v t v t x t
for x
p
f r x
t
o
α α α
α α α
⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +
⋅
⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −
⋅

≤ ≤

= 
 ≤ ≤

. 
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Therefore, the monopolist’s optimization problem with respect to market side 2 is formally 
described by 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
* 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
1
max
p
p n n p n p n p
=
Π = ⋅ + + ⋅ +

, 
which by using equations (18), (19), and (20) yields that 
(21) 1 2 2 2 1
1 2 2
1
2
2
1
*
1
1/ 4 ( 2 2 )
1/ 4 (
0 1/ 4
12 2 ) / 4 1/ 2
for x
p for x
v t x
v t x
α α
α α
⋅ − + + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
⋅ − + + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
≤ ≤
= 
< ≤
. 
 
Given equations (18), (19), (20), and (21), the location choice problem can be formulated as 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
1
* * 1 * 2 *
1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1max
x
p x p x n p x n p xΠ = + ⋅ +  
leading to the first-order condition 
1 2 1 2 1
11
2 1
1 2 1 2 2 1
1/ 2 ( 2 ( )) 0
1/ 2 (
0 1/ 4
1/ 42 ( 1) 2) 0 /
t v t x
t v t
for x
forx x x
α α
α α
⋅ + + ⋅ + + ⋅ =
⋅ + + ⋅
≤ ≤∂Π
=
− + + ≤= ≤⋅∂ 
. 
Hence, we find that 
(22) 
1 2
1
min
1
1
1 2
2
1 2 1 2
2
0 1/ 4
1/ 4
2 2
2
2
/
2
2 2 1
t v
t
for x
x
for xt v
t
α α
α α
 ≤ ≤

= 
 ≤
− − − ⋅ − ⋅
⋅
− − + ⋅
⋅
≤⋅

−

. 
Equation (22) is a unique minimum solution, because it can be shown that 
( )2 2 min1 1 0x x∂ Π ∂ > . Therefore, the optimal location must be a corner solution. We summarize 
the findings in Proposition 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Optimal location choice in a “competitive bottleneck”-framework  
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Proposition 3: On a “competitive bottleneck”-market, the optimal monopolistic location 
choice is either *1 1/ 4x =  and 
*
2 3 / 4x = , or 
* *
1 2 1/ 2x x= =  (or there is indifference between 
both solutions). 
Proof: For 10 1/ 4x≤ ≤ , it can be shown that 1 0x∂Π ∂ > , i.e. we would have min1 0x < , which 
implies that the optimal location is given by the corner solution *1 1/ 4x = . For 11/ 4 1/ 2x≤ ≤ , 
we have to separately analyze four different cases that are visualized in Figure 2: i) In case 
that min1 1/ 4x < , we find that 1 0x∂Π ∂ > , which implies that the profit-maximizing location 
of platform 1 is *1 1/ 2x = . This case is depicted by the black solid curve in Figure 2. ii) For 
( )min1 1/ 4,3 / 8x ∈ , we know that due to the symmetry of ( )1xΠ ,3 we have that *1 1/ 2x = , 
because ( ) ( )1/ 2 1/ 4Π > Π . In Figure 2, this case corresponds to the example of min1xˆ . iii) If 
we have that ( )min1 3 / 8,1/ 2x ∈ , we can conclude from the profit function’s symmetry that 
*
1 1/ 4x = , because ( ) ( )1/ 4 1/ 2Π > Π . This situation is visualized by min1x⌢  in Figure 2. iv) For 
min
1 1/ 2x > , it is easy to show that 1 0x∂Π ∂ < , which implies that *1 1/ 4x = . In Figure 2, this 
case is reflected by the dashed curve.  
In case that min1 3 / 8x = , we obviously find that the monopolist is indifferent between 
*
1 1/ 4x =  and 
*
1 1/ 2x = , since both locations yield the same profit.  
(q.e.d.) 
 
We find that the optimal platform locations are determined by the location of min1x , which is 
described by equation (22) and depends on the relation of the exogenous parameters 
1 2 2 1, , ,v tα α  and 2t . Using (22), comparative statics for the case of 11/ 4 1/ 2x≤ ≤  reveal that  
min min min min
1 1 1 1
1 2 2 2
, , , 0x x x x
t vα α
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
<
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 as well as 
min
1
1
0x
t
∂
>
∂
, 
which reflects the economics behind our findings: A marginal increase in 1t  has a negative 
impact on *1p , while demand on market side 1 is fixed. This reduces the marginal revenue 
from an increase of 1x , since we have that  
2
1 1
1 0
x t
∂ Π
= − <
∂ ∂
, 
which implies that the monopolist has an incentive to shift 1x to the left. In terms of equation 
(22), an increase of 1t  leads to an increase of min1x , making *1 1/ 4x =  more likely to occur. On 
the other hand, any increase in the profitability of market side 2, i.e. any increase of 2α , 2t  or 
2v , shifts the location of 
min
1x  to the left. Therefore, in this case 
*
1 1/ 2x =  becomes more 
likely. Obviously, the optimal platform location depends on the relative profitability of the 
                                                     
3
 It can be shown that for the relevant set of parameters, the profit function is symmetric with respect to the 
unique minimum solution. The corresponding Mathematica code is available from the authors upon request. 
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two market sides: If the single-homing market side is relatively more profitable with respect 
to the optimal platform location, we have ( )min1 3 / 8,1/ 2x ∈  and therefore *1 1/ 4x = , which 
corresponds to the solution of the two-sided single-homing case. In case that market side 2 is 
more profitable, we find the opposite, i.e. the outcome is consistent with our findings from 
Section 4. 
Comparing the results of Proposition 3 to a hypothetical one-sided benchmark with 0kα = , 
we find by analyzing equation (22) that the optimal location choice is qualitatively affected by 
the two-sidedness of the market. While there is no difference for the case of 10 1/ 4x≤ ≤ , we 
find that for 11/ 4 1/ 2x≤ ≤ , it may happen that the optimal platform location in the 
benchmark case is *1 1/ 4x = , whereas for 0kα ≠ , we could have 
*
1 1/ 2x =  (or vice versa). 
This result is consistent with our interpretation of Proposition 3, because the network 
externalities crucially influence the relative profitability of the two market sides.  
 
In case that the optimal location choice is *1 1/ 4x = , the profit is 
(23) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*
1
2 2
1 2 2 1 2 1 2*
1/4
2
2 8 2
2
8x
t t t v v
N
t
α α
=
+ ⋅ − ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅
Π
+
= =
⋅
 
( )22 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
2
4 ( 4 ) (2 4 )
8
v t v t v
t
α α α⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅
+
⋅
, 
whereas for *1 1/ 2x = , we obtain  
(24) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*
1
2 2
1 2 2 1 2 1 2*
1/2
2
4 8 4
2
8x
t t t v v
N
t
α α
=
+ ⋅ − ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅
Π
+
= =
⋅
 
( )22 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
2
4 2 ( 2 ) 2 ( 2 )
8
v t v t v
t
α α α⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅
+
⋅
. 
Since for 1N = , we have the single-homing solution of Section 2, the operator’s profit in this 
case is given by equation (2). Comparing equation (23) or (24) with equation (2), it can be 
shown that for 0kα < , ( ) ( )* *1 2N NΠ = < Π = . If 0kα >  and 0kα− <  or 0kα > , we obtain 
ambiguous results, i.e. the monopolist will operate either one or two platforms.  
 
6. Conclusions and Implications 
 
This paper analyzes the monopolistic location choice on a two-sided market. To some extent, 
the results of our analysis are consistent with the findings from one-sided markets: In Sections 
3 and 4 we found that the optimal location choice under two-sided single-homing and two-
sided multi-homing corresponds to the one-sided benchmark. While in case of two-sided 
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single-homing, optimal platform locations are at 1/4 and 3/4, the monopolist chooses perfectly 
homogeneous platforms in the optimum under two-sided multi-homing. The two-sidedness of 
the market only has a quantitative impact on optimal prices and profit, whereas the optimal 
location choice is not affected.  
 
To our knowledge, this paper is the first one to analyze the monopolistic location choice in a 
competitive bottleneck scenario, since there is no one-sided equivalent to this setting. When 
comparing the results of our two-sided framework to a hypothetical one-sided benchmark, we 
found that the optimal platform locations were crucially determined by the relative 
profitability of the two-market sides and hence, by the network externalities. In case that the 
single-homing side is more profitable, the optimal location choice corresponds to the case of 
two-sided single-homing. If the multi-homing side is relatively more profitable, we find the 
opposite result. It is also possible that the platform operator is indifferent between both 
strategies. 
In addition, our paper contributes to the economic literature dealing with mergers on two-
sided markets: Our results imply that two-sided merger simulations with fixed platform 
locations (at arbitrary locations or at their competitive benchmarks), do not correctly describe 
the economic behaviour under monopoly. In other words, models that assume fixed locations 
(usually at the ends of the Hotelling line), exogenously impose an additional restriction that 
potentially reduces the profit under “joint-management”. The same argument holds for the 
number of platforms: Our results indicate that the monopolistic platform operator may 
voluntarily decide to close down one platform. Choosing the correct monopolistic benchmark 
is basal for merger assessment as it affects welfare comparisons and therefore conclusions and 
policy implications. 
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